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Abstract 
 
Monitoring Internet traffic is critical in order to ac-
quire a good understanding of threats and in designing 
efficient security systems. While honeypots are flexible 
security tools for gathering intelligence of Internet 
attacks, traffic collected by honeypots is of high dimen-
sionality that makes it difficult to characterize. In this 
paper, we propose the use of principal component 
analysis, a multivariate analysis technique, for charac-
terizing honeypot traffic and separating latent groups 
of activities. In addition, we show the usefulness of 
principal component plots in visualizing the interrela-
tionships between the detected groups of activities and 
in finding outliers. This work is demonstrated through 
the use of low interaction honeypot traffic data from 
the Leurrè.com project, a world wide deployment of 
low interaction honeypots.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Characterizing attackers’ activities present in ho-
neypot traffic data can be challenging due to the high 
dimensionality of the data and the amount of traffic 
collected. The high amount of background noise, such 
as scans and backscatter, add to the challenge by hid-
ing interesting abnormal activities that require imme-
diate attention from security personnel. Detecting these 
outlying activities can potentially be of high value and 
give early signs of the discovery of new vulnerabilities 
or breakouts of new automated malicious codes, such 
as worms. In this work, we propose the use of principal 
component analysis (PCA), in the characterization of 
attacker activities present in low-interaction honeypot 
traffic data. While PCA has been used to characterize 
network traffic in the past, as far as we are aware this is 
the first time it has been used to characterize honeypot 
traffic. 
The use of PCA in this study is motivated by the 
popularity of PCA as an exploratory technique [1] that 
is easy to implement and requires less computational 
power than other linear methods, such as projection 
pursuit, and produces results that are easy to interpret. 
In this paper, the effectiveness of PCA in detecting the 
structures of attackers’ activities in honeypot traffic is 
demonstrated through the characterization of the at-
tackers’ activities into dominant groups, visualization 
of some the interrelationships between the extracted 
groups, and the ability to detect different types of out-
liers. Consequently, characterizing honeypot traffic 
will improve our understanding of attacker behaviors, 
optimization of honeypot design, and the identification 
of interesting activities. 
Pouget et al. [2] applied clustering techniques to 
low-interaction honeypots, with the port sequence of a 
‘large session’ as a main clustering feature, to group 
traffic that shares similar activity fingerprints, or attack 
tools. This study uses data from the same project, but 
with a different time span. In this paper, the raw ho-
neypot data is processed based on a well-known traffic 
flow technique [3] without the notion of sessions used 
in the Leurré.com project: large and tiny sessions. 
Moreover, our aim is to characterize attackers’ activi-
ties using principal component analysis, while their 
study was to characterize the root causes of attacks 
using association rules. In our previous work [4], we 
have used the cliquing algorithm to extract different 
groups of activities, that exhibit similarities, from low-
interaction honeypot clusters. Packet inter-arrival time 
distributions were used as the main clustering feature 
with the objective of identifying the repeated use of 
attack tools and attack processes. The cliquing algo-
rithm was applied to pre-clustered honeypot data for 
extracting refined activities. This work differs in that 
we apply PCA directly to the honeypot data.  
Lakhina et al. [5] use principal component analysis 
to decompose the structure of Origin-Destination 
flows, from two backbone networks, into three main 
constituents, namely periodic trends, bursts and noise. 
Labib et al. [6] proposed a method of detecting two 
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classes of attacks, Denial-of-Service and Network-
Probe, present in the 1998 DARPA data set; they uti-
lized PCA in reducing the dimensionality of the traffic 
vector and identifying attacks. Our work differs by 
applying PCA to data from low-interaction honeypots 
for finding dominant groups of attacker’s activities and 
finding outliers. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 
provides a brief summary of principal component anal-
ysis. The dataset used in this study and the preprocess-
ing is described in Section 3. Section 4, details the 
process of applying PCA to the preprocessed honeypot 
data. Interpretations of the principal components (PCs) 
are presented in Section 5 while the interrelationships 
between the components are discussed in Section 6. 
Detection of outliers based on plots of the PCs is dis-
cussed in Section 7. Finally, the results are discussed 
and the paper is concluded in Section 8. 
 
2. Principal component analysis 
 
Principal component analysis (PCA) is a multiva-
riate statistical technique that has been widely used in 
multi-disciplinary research areas such as internet traffic 
analysis, economics, image processing, and genetics, to 
name only a few. PCA is mainly used to reduce the 
dimensionality of a data set into a few uncorrelated 
variables, principal components (PCs), which retain 
most of the variation in the original data [1, 7-9]. The 
resulting principal components are a linear combina-
tion of the original variables, are orthogonal, and or-
dered with the first principal component having the 
largest variance. Although the number of resulting 
principal components is equal to the number of original 
variables, much of the variance in the original set of p 
variables can be retained by the first k PCs, where k< 
p. Thus, the original p variables can be replaced by the 
new k principal components.  
Given the p-dimensional random variables X=(X1, 
..,Xp)T with a sample mean iX and a sample covariance 
matrix !, we seek to find a lower dimension vector 
A=(A1, ..,Ak)T of ! that has the maximum variance of 
the original data with all the Eigenvalues being greater 
than zero. Thus, the first linear function Z1 of X having 
maximum variance: 
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The second linear function Z2 is uncorrelated with 
Z1 and having the second largest variance and so on 
until the kth function, Zk, is found which is uncorrelated 
with Z1,…,Zk-1. For the interested reader, full discus-
sion of principal component analysis can be found in 
[1, 7].  
Principal component analysis has the following ad-
vantages: 
• It does not require any distributional assumptions 
and can be used with many types of data. 
• The extracted principal components are uncorre-
lated. 
• The first few principal components retain most of 
the variation in the original data. 
In this work, PCA is utilized to search for groups of 
activities found in the honeypot traffic, without as-
sumptions about these groups or interrelationships be-
tween them. In addition, some of our objectives in this 
study are to explore the usefulness of PCA in visualiz-
ing honeypot traffic, finding interrelationships between 
groups of activities, and detecting outliers.  
 
3. Dataset and preprocessing 
 
In this section we describe the dataset used in this 
study and the preprocessing that has been applied to 
the data. 
 
3.1. Dataset 
 
The honeypot traffic data used in this analysis 
comes from the Leurrè.com project [8]. The 
Leurrè.com project was launched in 2004 for collecting 
malicious traffic using globally distributed, identical 
honeypot environments; currently 50 platforms are 
deployed in 30 different countries. The Leurré.com 
honeypot sensor is based on the open source low-
interaction honeyd  [9]. Each sensor runs on a single 
host and emulates three operating systems at the same 
time (on different IP addresses): Windows 2003 Pro-
fessional; Windows 2003 Server; and Linux Red Hat. 
For the purpose of this study, only one low-interaction 
honeypot sensor’s data is used due to the availability of 
log files. Traffic data for the period of September 15 
until November 31, 2007 for two of the honeypot envi-
ronments were included, namely Windows 2003 Pro-
fessional and Windows 2003 Server. Both environ-
ments are identical in terms of open ports, TCP and 
UDP. The traffic traces consist of 839663 packets 
which were the result of attacks from over 5400 differ-
ent IP addresses. 
 
3.2. Preprocessing 
 
Before applying the PCA to the traffic data, the fol-
lowing steps were performed to process the raw traffic 
data. First, raw tcpdump [10] files of daily honeypot 
148
Authorized licensed use limited to: QUEENSLAND UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY. Downloaded on May 20, 2009 at 06:50 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
data were collected and merged into a single traffic 
file. Then packets were grouped together (according to 
the notation of flow [3]) into basic flows; our basic 
flow conforms to the standard definition of an IP flow, 
namely the five-tuple containing the: source IP ad-
dress, destination IP address, source port, destination 
port, and protocol type. If a packet differs from another 
packet by any key field, it is considered to belong to 
another flow [11, 12]. For the purpose of this study, we 
set the timeout of basic flows to a maximum of five 
minutes. The five-minute timeout parameter was se-
lected based on our experiments and the nature of low-
interaction honeypots where the majority of flows are 
less than 300 seconds; a higher value of time out has 
little influence in the final results. The second step was 
to group the basic flows again into what we call activi-
ty flow, where the newly generated flows were com-
bined based upon the source IP address of the attacker 
with a maximum of sixty minutes inter-arrival time 
between basic flows. Finally, the data is filtered to re-
move internet noise, such as backscatter [13]. 
 
3.3. Candidate feature selection 
 
As described above, this study deals with two types 
of flows: basic and activity flows. The basic flow con-
forms to the definition of the standard flow [3, 12], 
which is a unidirectional series of IP packets with the 
same source IP and destination IP, source port and des-
tination port and protocol number, with a timeout of 
five minutes. The second type of flow is the activity 
flow; an aggregation of basic flows based on the source 
IP address only with a timeout of sixty minutes, or 
inter-arrival times between two basic flows is less than 
sixty minutes. 
Traffic features computed from the activity flows 
include: the total number of basic flows generated by 
individual IP and aggregated based on sixty minutes; 
total number of open TCP ports targeted; total number 
of distinct open TCP ports targeted; total number of 
open UDP ports targeted; total number of distinct open 
UDP ports targeted; total number of closed UDP ports 
targeted; total number of distinct closed UDP ports 
targeted; total number of ICMP flows;  number of ma-
chines targeted per attack; total duration of basic flows;  
total number of source packets sent per IP; total num-
ber of source bytes sent; total source rates which is the 
sum of the source rates of all the basic flows, where a 
source rate is number of source packets in a basic flow 
divided by the duration of that flow; sum of the aver-
age packet size per basic flow; total activities as the 
summation of source and destination rates; and  sum-
mation of inter-arrival times between basic flows. Ta-
ble 1 lists the selected 18 variables and their descrip-
tions. 
 
Table 1. Variables used in the analysis 
No. Variable Description 
1 TF Total number of basic flows 
2 TCP_O Total number of open TCP ports tar-
geted 
3 D_TCP_O Total number of distinct open TCP 
ports targeted 
4 TCP_C Total number of closed TCP ports 
targeted 
5 D_TCP_C Total number of distinct closed TCP 
ports targeted 
6 UDP_O Total number of open UDP ports 
targeted 
7 D_UDP_O Total number of distinct open UDP 
ports targeted 
8 UDP_C Total number of closed UDP ports 
targeted 
9 D_UDP_C Total number of distinct closed UDP 
ports targeted 
10 ICMP Total number of ICMP flows 
11 TM Total number of machines targeted 
12 DUR Total duration of basic flows 
13 SPKTS Total number of source packets 
14 SBYTES Total number of source bytes 
15 SRATE Total of source rates of basic flows 
16 AVG_PK_SIZE Sum of average packet size  
17 T_ACT Total Activities 
18 IAT Total inter-arrival times between basic 
flows 
 
These traffic features were selected as being repre-
sentative of the behavior of the three transport layer 
protocols that are monitored by the honeypot, namely 
TCP, UDP and ICMP. We expect these variables to 
have some correlations between them which will be 
identified and removed during the principal component 
analysis. 
 
4.  PCA on the honeypot data set 
 
Principal component analysis can be calculated us-
ing either the covariance matrix or the correlation ma-
trix. However, PCs defined using the covariance matrix 
are very sensitive to the unit of measurement of va-
riables. In addition, when the variance of the variables 
differs widely, which is the case for the honeypot data, 
the first few PCs will be dominated by variables with 
high variances, as they contribute little information to 
the structure of the data set. Moreover, one drawback 
of PCs on covariance matrices, with different units of 
measurement, is the difficulty in interpreting the PC 
scores. Thus, the use of correlation rather than the co-
variance matrix for deriving the PCs was preferred in 
our analysis. 
To calculate the PCs from the correlation matrix, 
the p-dimensional vector X=(X1, ..,Xp)T is standardized 
by: 
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for i=1,.,p, where iX  is the sample mean and si is the 
sample variance for Xi. Let R be the sample correlation 
matrix of C with Eigenvalue vector l=(l1,….,lp), then 
the principal component analysis  
CAZ T=    (3) 
where A= (A1, ..,Ak)T is the Eigenvector of  R, with the 
first component equals to: 
pp
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In PCA, components are in decreasing order where 
the most important component, which is listed first, has 
the highest variance value. Consequently, only the first 
few PCs are retained as they explain most the variance 
in the data. 
The Kaisers’ rule [14] for eliminating PCs with Ei-
genvalue less than one suggests retaining the first six 
components (see Table 2 for the Eigenvalues). The 
cumulative total variance of these components is 80% 
of the total variance of the original data.  
However, the extracted communalities of variables, 
an amount of variance within each variable accounted 
for by the components, indicate that one of the va-
riables, namely total number of distinct open TCP 
ports targeted, has a low extraction value. This sug-
gests the inclusion of more components. After the in-
clusion of the seventh component, all the communali-
ties are high, which indicates that the extracted compo-
nents represent the variables well.  
 
Table 2. Extracted principal components  
Principal 
Component 
Eigenvalues % of Variance Cumulative 
% 
1 5.410 30.054 30.054 
2 2.374 13.190 43.244 
3 2.153 11.959 55.204 
4 1.681 9.339 64.543 
5 1.432 7.954 72.497 
6 1.362 7.567 80.064 
7 .959 5.329 85.393 
 
The Scree plot of energy contributed by each com-
ponent is summarized in Figure 1. This plot suggests 
that between six and seven components can be retained 
as the sharp drop occurs between the sixth and seventh 
component where the Eigenvalues are greater than or 
equal to 1. The sharp drop in the curve indicates a typi-
cal cutoff for selecting the correct number of compo-
nents to be considered in the analysis. 
All of the above supports our decision to retain sev-
en components with the rest of the components being 
eliminated. Table 2 shows the accumulated percentages 
of the total variances of the 18 extracted components. 
The first seven components contribute over 85% of the 
total variance in the original data, which suggest that 
the extracted components are very representative of the 
data. 
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Figure 1. Scree plot of Eigenvalues 
 
5. Interpretation of the results 
 
As mentioned earlier, components are in decreasing 
order of importance, where components with larger 
variances are more important and give more informa-
tion about the data. The components were rotated to 
simplify the analysis and make the interpretation easi-
er.  
Interpretation of the components is achieved by ex-
amining the loading of the variables for each compo-
nent as variables with high loading are of high signific-
ance in the interpretation. Then, each PC’s interpreta-
tion was validated by inspecting sample traffic against 
the original data. For this study, we have selected va-
riables with a loading value over 0.6 as they are the 
most significant in the analysis. 
Interpretation of the first seven PCs (PC1-PC7) for 
the honeypot data is summarized in Table 3. The first 
component (PC1) is highly correlated with the total 
number of basic flows, total number of TCP ports tar-
geted, total duration of basic flows, total number of 
source packets, and total number of source bytes. The 
first component indicates high interactions between 
attackers and the honeypot on open ports and as the 
variance suggests, is the most important component. 
PC2 is highly correlated with closed TCP ports. This 
component suggests vertical and horizontal scan activi-
ties which focus on very specific ports. In PC3, activi-
ties target closed UDP ports and could be interpreted as 
spam, worm activities, or mis-configured servers. PC4 
is related to repeated activities over a short period of 
time; this is explained by the high correlations between 
the total activities and variables in the first PC’s va-
riables, such as SPKTS, SBYTES, DUR, TCP_O, and 
TF. PC5 is represented by the total machines targeted 
and ICMP traffic. It can be inferred that these activities 
are of IPs sweeping the globe seeking live machines. 
PC6 represents activities that target open UDP ports. 
PC7 is a subset of the first component and represents 
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short attacks against specific open ports, mainly port 
80, 139, and 445. 
 
Table 3. Interpretations of the first 7 components 
Component Percentage 
of variation 
Interpretation  
1 30.054 % Targeted attacks against open ports 
2 13.190 % Scans activities 
3 11.959 % Spam or miss-configuration 
4 9.339 % Repeated short activities  
5 7.954 % Detection activities 
6 7.567 % Targeted attacks against open UDP ports  
7 5.329 % Short attacks  
 
The principal component analysis of the data shows 
that there are at least seven clusters of activities 
represented in the data. These clusters of activities can 
be separated and then PCA can be applied further to 
find new sub-clusters of activities and the process re-
peated.!
 
6. Interrelations between components 
 
Plots of PCs can serve two main purposes: to define 
the interrelations between components and to identify 
outliers. As discussed in Section 5 (interpretation of 
the results), the two components PC2 and PC5 
represent two types of activities: TCP scanning and 
live machine detection respectively. The interrelation-
ships between these two components are presented in 
Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Scatter plot of TCP scan (PC2) vs. 
live machine detection (PC5) 
 
The figure shows that there are at least two clusters 
of activities: detection with very few scans, on the up-
per left side of the figure along the PC5 axes; scans 
with very few machine detection activities at the bot-
tom of the figure along the PC2 axes. Mixed activities, 
moderate rate of scans with moderate live machine 
detection activities are located in the middle part of the 
figure. Extreme activities of scanning and live machine 
detection activities are also visible as far points along 
both PC axes. 
An example of scan only activities is observation 
4253, which originated in Germany. The IP scanned all 
machines for closed port 2967 and then two weeks 
later scanned closed port 5904. Observation 304 is an 
example of the second type, live machine detector. The 
IP originated in Japan and was only involved in detec-
tion activities. 
 
7. Identification of extreme activities in 
honeypot traffic 
 
Detecting extreme activities in honeypot traffic is 
analogous to outlier detection in multivariate statistics. 
Outliers, in statistics, can be defined as observations 
that deviate largely from the rest of the data [15]. In 
honeypot traffic, outliers are extreme activities that are 
distanced from the p-dimensional hyperspace defined 
by the variables. The aim of detecting these extreme 
activities is to help in searching for the root causes of 
variations in patterns of the defined structures, and take 
measures to protect production networks against them. 
Outliers in honeypot might arise from many malicious 
network activities, such as releases of newly automated 
codes (worms) or discovery of new vulnerabilities; or 
even mis-configured servers. 
One of the challenges in detecting outliers in high 
dimension data, such as honeypot traffic, is the diffi-
culties of inspecting large numbers of variables in the 
data set simultaneously. In addition, inspecting each 
variable by itself or even inspecting plots of pairs of 
variables might not reveal any extreme behavior when 
the combination of multiple variables is considered an 
outlier. This study provides a preliminary investigation 
of utilizing principal component analysis in detecting 
extreme observations, through: graphical inspection of 
the first few and last few principal components’ Plots; 
and the statistics of squares of the weighted principal 
component scores against the squared Mahalanobis 
distance. 
Inspecting two and three dimensional scatter plots 
of the first few and last few PCs for detecting outlying 
observations was suggested by Gnanadesikan [16]. 
This was justified since, the first few PCs are good in 
detecting outliers that inflate the correlations, while the 
last few PCs are useful in detecting outliers that add 
unimportant dimensions to the data and are hard to 
distinguish from the original variables. 
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Figure 3. Scatter plot of the first two principal 
components 
 
The scatter plot of the first two principal compo-
nents is illustrated in Figure 3. These two components, 
PC1 and PC2, account for 43% of the total variance in 
the data. The first component has high loading values 
on multiple variables: total number of basic flows, total 
number of open TCP ports targeted, total durations of 
basic flows, total number of source packets, and total 
number of source bytes. The second component has 
two variables with high loadings on total number of 
closed TCP ports and distinct closed TCP ports tar-
geted. Outlying observations (circled on the plot) can 
be spotted, in Figure 3, as points that have extreme 
values along the principal component axes near the 
edges, far from the body of data. Observations 4124, 
4900, 3929, 4892, 4131, 3720, 426, 4890 and 428 are 
extreme on the first principal component (PC1) while 
observations 426 and 428 are extreme on the second 
principal component (PC2). Two observations are in 
common, namely: 428 and 426. These observations are 
possible outliers that require further investigation.  
 
Figure 4. Scatter plot of the last two components 
 
The scatter plot of the last two principal compo-
nents, PC17 and PC18, which account for less than 1% 
of the total variance, is illustrated in Figure 4. There 
are two observations, 4131 and 1193 that are extreme 
for PC17 and PC18 near the edges of the graph.  
Although, scatter plots of principal components are 
very useful for spotting outlying observations visually, 
automatic detection of outlying observations can be 
achieved through construction of a control ellipse. As 
the contours of constant probability for p-dimensional 
normal distribution are ellipsoids [7], the ellipsoid de-
fined by random vectors x has the following characte-
ristics: 
• Constant probability contour for the distribution 
of x is defined by  
const
l
zp
k k
ik
=!
=1
2
   (5) 
where Zik is the score of kth PC of ith observation 
and lk is the kth Eigenvalue. 
• The ellipsoid is centered at the mean and its axes 
lie along the principal components where half the 
square root of the Eigenvalues (l11/2, l21/2, …, lp1/2) 
are the lengths of its semi-major and semi-minor 
axes. 
• The ellipsoid of p-dimensional space of x value 
satisfies 
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where x2p(!) is the percentile of a chi-square dis-
tribution with p degrees of freedom. 
Setting a threshold for detecting outlying observa-
tions based on x2p (!) requires the distribution of x to 
be multivariate normal. However, since we do not 
make any assumptions about the distribution of our 
data, the population ellipsoid  
const
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   (7) 
is still valid despite any normality assumption, but the 
ellipsoid loses its interpretation as contours of constant 
probability [1].  Based on the empirical distribution of 
the first two components PC1 and PC2, Equation 7 
becomes:  
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Figure 5 provides a zoom into Figure 3 omitting the 
very clear outliers and a sketch of the control ellipse 
for the first two principal components. 
 
Figure 5. Ellipse of a constant distance based on the 
first two components  
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Jollife [1] discussed the uses of the sum of the 
squares of the weighted principal component scores of 
the last q  principal components in detecting outliers 
that are hard to distinguish from the original variables, 
which is given by:  
!
+−=
=
p
qpk k
ik
i l
z
D
1
2
   (9) 
where q<p and zik is the score of kth PC of ith observa-
tion and lk is the kth Eigenvalue. When q=p, the equa-
tion represents the squared Mahalanobis distance of the 
ith observation from the mean of the data, which is giv-
en by: 
)()()( 12 xxSxxxM i
T
ii −−=
−    (10) 
Figure 6 provides a scatter plot of the statistics Di vs. 
(M2-Di) for detecting outliers that are different from the 
first p-q [17]. 
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Figure 6. Scatter plot of the statistics Di vs. (M2-Di) 
 
Finally, most of the detected outlying observations 
were identified by more than one statistic, but with 
different ordering. Table 4 lists the top 5 outliers or-
dered according to their significance (from high to 
low).  
 
Table 4.  Top five extreme observations 
PC1 PC2 PC17 PC18 M2 D2 M2-D2 
4124   426  4131  1193  1980    614      1980    
4900   428 5094   4900 426     426 426   
3929   2228 5386 4426 614     4917    4124    
4892 3222   4124 4882 4124    3620    428      
4131   362   4915   419 428     4131   4900   
 
7.1. Evaluation of the detected outliers 
 
To evaluate our methodology and judge the signi-
ficance of the detected outliers, sample points of the 
outlying observations were manually inspected against 
the original data set to explain the reasons these points 
were selected as outliers. 
• Observation 4124, which is extreme in PC1, Fig-
ure 3, was a result of an attack from an IP in the 
USA targeting one machine on a single open TCP 
port, port 80. The attack started on Wednesday, 
21 November 2007 at 06:18:44 GMT and ended 
on Friday, 23 November 2007 at 08:01:08 GMT. 
The attack generated over 150,062 packets. Ob-
servation 4124 was also extreme on M2, (M2-Di), 
and PC17.  
• Observation 2228 is extreme on both PC2 and 
(M2-Di) statistics. The attacking IP originated in 
China and lasted for less than 10 seconds. It was a 
combination of ICMPs and moderate scans of 
seven unusual closed TCP ports and one TCP 
open port, port 80. The attacker targeted all ma-
chines on the honeypot environment. 
• Observation 3105 is extreme in PC2 only. The IP 
address originated in China and was also respon-
sible for another outlying observation, 3104. The 
IP address was involved in scanning activities. 
The first two attacks were detected as outliers, on 
14/11/2007 and on 22/11/2007. However, the last 
attack that was launched on 22/11/2007 against 
open ports, which went undetected as it was not 
extreme on any dimension. 
• Observation 1193 is extreme on both PC17 and 
PC18. The IP address originated in Thailand and 
lasted for 40 minutes. It was mainly alternating 
connections to two open TCP ports 445 and 139 
and one TCP closed port 9988. This observation 
has large value on TCP_O variable, moderate 
values on TF, DUR, and SPKTS variables, and 
low values on TC_C, and ICMP variables. 
• Observation 614 is an outlier on M2 and Di statis-
tics. It was caused by an attack from an IP ad-
dress that originated in Romania and lasted for 40 
minutes. It was mainly connections to two open 
TCP ports (445 and 139) and one closed TCP port 
(9988). This observation shows similar behaviors 
to observation 1193 with the same duration, but 
with different IP from different country a week 
later. 
• Observation 1980 generated a large amount of 
UDP traffic (two packets every 30 minutes) 
against port 137. The attack took place between 
Thursday, 18 Oct 2007 and Wednesday, 24 Oct 
2007 and has large UDP_O and IAT values. This 
observation is on the top lists of outliers on both 
M2 and (M2-Di). 
The main source of difference between the two sta-
tistics M2 and (M2-Di) was due to the value of q in Di 
statistics. More experiments are needed to select an 
appropriate value for the current data set. Moreover, 
setting a higher value for activity flow time-out, cur-
rently 60 minutes, would improve the detection of at-
tacks that propagate slowly over an extended period, 
such as observations 1980 and 3105. 
The detection of outliers serves as a first step for an 
online model for monitoring honeypots. As detailed 
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before, these outlying observations could be eliminated 
from the data and PCs could be recomputed from a 
robust version of the correlation matrix [16]. 
 
8. Conclusions and future work 
 
In this paper, we have proposed the use of principal 
component analysis (PCA) on the traffic flows of low-
interaction honeypots. PCA proves to be very powerful 
tool in detecting the structure of attackers’ activities 
and the decomposition of the traffic into seven domi-
nant clusters. Moreover, scatter plots of the PCs are 
very efficient in looking at the interrelationships be-
tween components or groups of activities and in identi-
fying any extreme traffic. Our experimental results on 
real traffic data show that principal component analysis 
could provide security administrators with a very sim-
ple and efficient way of summarizing honeypot traffic 
and monitoring activities. 
Although our study was done off-line, it serves as a 
seed for a future real time model for monitoring ho-
neypot traffic and providing security personnel prompt 
alerts of internet threats. Areas for future research in-
clude the implementation of the proposed model as a 
real time monitoring system of honeypots, experimen-
tation with different data from different honeypot envi-
ronments and different time periods. 
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